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On scratching your own itch
Spencer Roberts
Art, Design and Architecture, University of Huddersﬁeld, West Yorkshire, UK
ABSTRACT
Following Massimo Banzi’s comment that the Arduino development board
might be seen as a means of ‘scratching your own itch’, this paper explores
the concept of affect in relation to physical computing, and investigates the
ways in which cybernetic and networked objects could be said to enact a
series of process-philosophical and object-oriented tensions. In so doing it
addresses the cultural saturation of Arduino and its employment in an array of
institutional, artistic and activist contexts, and brings this to bear on the
conﬂict between the process philosophy of Gilles Deleuze and the more
directly object-oriented perspectives of Graham Harman, Ian Bogost and
Bruno Latour. Framing the enquiry around the at once ethico-aesthetic and
speculative realist questions of what it is to ‘scratch’ and what it is to ‘itch’, the
paper examines micro- and macro-political agency in the context of physical
computing—contrasting process philosophy’s pronounced notion of affective,
connective, creative differentiation with the black-boxed, withdrawn objects of
object-oriented philosophy, and its quasi-causal mode of aesthetic interaction.
KEYWORDS
Arduino; process philosophy;
object-oriented ontology;
Gilles Deleuze; Graham
Harman
1. Introduction
In a recent TED Talk, Banzi (2012), one of the
originators of the Arduino development plat-
form, made a number of observations that
were concerned broadly with the character,
reach and impact of the Arduino project. He
described the open and distributed ethos of
the Arduino initiative and positioned these
qualities as characteristics of the open source
and digital-making communities per se. He
likewise drew attention to the ubiquity and cul-
tural saturation of Arduino. That is to say, after
explaining that Arduino was the control mech-
anism that sat at the heart of the ﬁrst open
source 3D printer, Banzi went on to highlight
how the system was used by children, hackti-
vists and government institutions alike.
Banzi’s examples illustrate the way in which
Arduino is operational in both institutional and
Do It Yourself (DIY) contexts—on the one
hand it is employed as a data logger at the Euro-
pean Organization for Nuclear Research (CERN)
and as the platform for peripheral development
for Google’s Android operating system, whilst
on the other it reports more accurate statistics
of radiation levels in post Fukushima Japan—
countering the ofﬁcial government reports that
seemed to downplay levels of contamination.
Banzi drew attention to the use of Arduino in
hacktivist and aid projects alike—citing the
txtbomber as a system for the more efﬁcient dis-
tribution of grafﬁti, as well as a DIY drone heli-
copter that could be utilised for the delivery of
resources to remote and cut-off villages in Africa.
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Central to Banzi’s broadly relational posi-
tioning of the project were the notions that,
ﬁrstly, Arduino had arisen out of a pragmatic
need (creating a rapid prototyping system for
students to use at Ivrea), secondly, it had
involved the input of an at once diverse, colla-
borative and contingent network of people (an
international development team that was
thrown together through their teaching at the
same institution) and thirdly that the system
as a whole constituted a ‘mash up’ of existing
open source technologies such as GCC, AVR-
DUDE, avr-libc and JAVA. He stressed that
the level of engagement and participation that
had built upon the platform had surpassed all
expectations—and that Arduino had gone
‘into every ﬁeld imaginable’ becoming an inte-
gral component of a vast and ever expanding
array of technical systems.
Interestingly, Banzi’s comments concerning
the impact, creative potential and embedded
nature of the project were coupled with obser-
vations addressing a more affective territory.
That is to say, having explained to his audience
that he felt ‘overwhelmed’ by the project’s suc-
cess, Banzi went to depict the creative use of
Arduino as a means of ‘scratching your own
itch’ which he closely equated with the idea of
‘open-sourcing imagination’.
Although there is something faintly philoso-
phically idealistic about Banzi’s discussion of
the issue, in the sense that he positioned the
platform as a means of realising ones creative
vision, his phrase ‘scratching your own itch’
also provides an avenue for considering the pro-
ject in relation to contemporary aesthetics and
to more materialistic, theories of affect.
2. Affect theories
Affect theorists are typically resistant to what
they take to be ethereal ‘mind-centric’
approaches to the world (Massumi 2002; Ben-
nett 2010; Gregg and Gregory 2010), frequently
deriving inspiration from the ‘double aspect’
materialist philosophy of the seventeenth
century Dutch philosopher Baruch Spinoza
(1955) that effectively collapses matter and sen-
sation into the operation of a single substance.
Accordingly, theorists of this kind typically dis-
tinguish two senses of the term ‘affect’. The ﬁrst,
and more pedestrian of the two, is primarily
psychological or phenomenological in charac-
ter, being concerned solely with qualities
of felt experience. This psychological notion of
affect is manifest both in Banzi’s feeling of
being ‘overwhelmed’ by the success of the pro-
ject, and also, if we take his metaphor literally,
in the felt, qualitative sense of nagging irritation
that we ordinarily describe as an itch. However,
there is a second, more signiﬁcant sense of the
term, which stresses the ontological power of
material things and their transformative effects
upon the world. This has a greater materialist
emphasis and thus a stronger connection with
behaviour. Accordingly, with respect to this
second sense of the term, there is less of a con-
cern with how something qualitatively feels, and
a stronger emphasis upon our pre-subjective
and pre-personal entanglement with the
material world. That is to say, from the perspec-
tive of affect theory there is a stronger concern
with the processes and potentialities that in
some sense constitute our changing subjective
experience.
This latter more strongly physicalist notion
of affect draws our attention to the behavioural
imperative to scratch that is closely intertwined
with the felt sense of itching, and to the behav-
ioural imperative to ‘make’ that might accom-
pany a speculative vision of possibility. Whilst
seemingly opposed along phenomenal and
materialist lines, the two senses of the term
are not so easily extricated. That is to say,
from a contemporary Spinozist position, there
is a sense in which the imperative to scratch
and the felt sense of itching are intimately con-
nected. That is to say they are each an
expression of the same energetic conﬂuence—
the different orders of connection, movement
and rest which both carry and are carried
through the abrasive felt sensation and the
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movement of the body alike (Massumi 2002).
Thus from the position of affect theory, a ﬁnger-
nail drawn across a localised area of the skin
functions materially as probe, disruptive inter-
vention and as an energetic re-channelling or
re-distribution of kinetic force (DeLanda 2002).
Whilst affect theorists are generally critical of
centred notions of psychological life that imply
a Kantian or Cartesian subject or an overly
cohesive self, they nevertheless afﬁrm the
notion that there is an intensive logic to experi-
ence. That is to say, they recognise that there is
something materially signiﬁcant in the rise and
fall of sensation and emotion, or in the way in
which emotional states envelop or occlude one
another—positioning them as analogous to a
more fundamental, but similarly intensive, set
of material operations (Williams 2008).
3. Computational and performative
conceptions of process
Banzi’s comments were focused upon the prag-
matic activities of the Maker Movement, but
invite broader philosophical reﬂection upon
concepts of process, object and relation, along
with the relationship of these concepts to mate-
riality, creativity and the production of the new.
There is a clear sense in which the embrace of
Arduino by children, hacktivists and govern-
ment agencies alike when considered alongside
the diversity of its operational contexts not only
draws attention to the ubiquity and ﬂexibility
that is enabled by the Arduino’s socio-technical
context, but also highlights an important dis-
tinction that might be made between a reductive
and a playful sense of material/machinic possi-
bilities. That is to say, in one sense the machine
logic of a computer perfectly exempliﬁes a kind
of formalism. Standing as a physical embodi-
ment or manifestation of a rationalist mindset
it foregrounds concerns of clarity, efﬁciency
and parsimony. This rather rationalist image
of computation underpins its connection with
management, classiﬁcation and the reduction
of the complex to the simple. Ultimately, it
was this rather disembodied conception of com-
putation that dominated the early history of
computing. The concept of the Universal Tur-
ing Machine was primarily concerned with
simulation/replication of abstract functional
systems. Whilst it is true that in essence it
described a physical-mechanical computer
with a memory tape that was inﬁnite in length,
it should not be forgotten that Turning’s
‘machine’ was abstract, algorithmic and non-
physical in character (Penrose 1989). Turing
had attempted to create the minimal speciﬁca-
tion for a procedure that would be capable of
capturing or simulating any other kind of for-
mal mechanism—thus we might present him
both as a conceptual thinker and as the superla-
tive information ‘de-signer’—in the sense that
he stands as the author of a radically reductive
and abstract concept of simulation. However,
it seems slightly absurd—and somewhat ironic,
that this collection of strictly formal require-
ments should give rise to a tool ideally suited
to postmodern practice and production with
its contrary aesthetics of complexity, plurality
and difference. This seems perhaps less surpris-
ing when we consider the complexity of Turing
himself. Dieter Daniels (2007) notes how Tur-
ing’s description of the ﬁrst phase of the Turing
Test—an AI scenario in which an interlocutors
must attempt to guess the gender identity of an
anonymous pair of subjects—‘reads like the per-
fect psychograph of Turing himself’ and
‘implicitly contains a thesis that forty years
later Judith Butler (Fuss 1991) supported in a
feminist context: gender identity is… a discur-
sive construct that ﬁrst comes to light in perfor-
mative acts’. Arguably, it is a more playful,
performative and postmodern conception of
computation that provides the context both
for much computational art and for modes of
digital activism. Here, the DIY ideals of the con-
temporary Maker Movement are supplemented
with an agonistic politics, with the aim of devel-
oping socio-technical modes of political resist-
ance. In contrast to Turing, the conception of
function developed by Actor Network theorists
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such as Bruno Latour (1993, 1996, 2005), John
Law (Law and Hassard 1999) andMichel Callon
(Callon and Latour 1981), though still systems
oriented and still in many ways appealing to
themanagerial mindset, is bottom up as opposed
to top-down in character. Latour’s performative
conception of function is bothmorematerialistic
and more playful than Turing’s, ultimately
allowing for—and even requiring—tensions,
interference and slippage (Latour 1996). For
Latour, there is recognition that systems are
founded upon performative regularity, but
there is also a recognition that all such perform-
ances are contingent andprovisional in character
—embodying internal tensions and contradic-
tions, and likewise being susceptible to external
inﬂuence that results in their transformation.
4. A process-philosophical lineage
There are tensions between the concepts of
object and performative process that can be
located in Actor Network Theory, and this
serves to foreground its process-philosophical
lineage. Process philosophy has been present
as a minor current in Western philosophy
since as early as 540 BC (Rescher 1996). Process
philosophies tend to emphasise both the onto-
logical priority of change and the relational con-
stitution of entities. From the perspective of
process philosophy, the world of stable and
enduring things arises out of a differential play
of interacting forces that admit of multiple
and contingent patterns of relation (Rescher
1996, 10). Given its emphasis upon the move-
ment, transformation and development of
phenomena, as well as its emphasis upon exter-
nal or extrinsic relations with respect to the con-
stitution of things, the process perspective is less
interested in any stable, essentialist or object-
centric deﬁnitions of the substance of entities,
but instead focuses upon performative descrip-
tions of their role and constitution (Rescher
2000, 15). Thus there is a functionalist orien-
tation to process-relational thinking, but it is a
functionalism that is tempered with a creative
and vitalist bent. Accordingly, the process per-
spective is as much interested in the transform-
ation of practices as it is in their functional
description, and interestingly for our purposes
here, such transformation is itself typically pre-
sented as the result of the connection of things
through some kind of material encounter. Pro-
cess ontology tends to be philosophically mon-
istic in character, positioning all phenomena as,
at root, a manifestation of a more fundamental
category of material-process. In this sense, it has
a reductive slant. However, with the adoption of
the seemingly neutral category of ‘process’ as its
foundation, there is an important sense in
which it prioritises neither the conceptual nor
the experiential in its account of phenomena.
That is to say, implicated in process-relational
philosophy’s ontological monism is a phenom-
enal pluralism that is neither straightforwardly
empiricist nor straightforwardly idealist in
character (Rescher 2000, 9). Thus the process
perspective brings with it a multi-modal, con-
nective emphasis that confers a distinctive neu-
trality upon its analysis, and this brings it to
bear upon a wide range of phenomena. Thus,
from the perspective of process philosophy
there are levels and modalities of emergent
order, but there is also a sense in which every-
thing is capable of melting or morphing into
everything else (Rescher 1996, 15). As a conse-
quence, process philosophy has the power to
collapse dualistic vocabularies and deal posi-
tively with systemic tensions—ultimately
suggesting a picture of the world that empha-
sises complexity, emergence and the aspectual
qualities of things. With this picture of connec-
tive transformation in mind, Rescher has noted
that one of the great promises of process-rela-
tional thinking is its methodological power to
formulate comparisons (Rescher 1996, 4).
5. Arduino and process-philosophical
analysis
Consideration of the character of the Arduino
board lends itself to such a process-relational
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analysis. Thus in a recent paper presented at the
new materialist Non Human Turn conference,
Lessard (2012) discussed the way in which we
might consider the Arduino under a variety of
interfacial aspects. Lessard drew attention to
the physical, software and electrical interfaces
that are involved in the production of an Ardu-
ino project. This ﬂexibility of aspect illustrates
the way in which it is possible to take radically
different ontological stances within the context
of digital design. Thus, for contemporary ‘cul-
tural’ theorists such as Manovich (2013), who
in some sense inherits a set of structuralist, lin-
guistic concerns, it is only software that matters
—for Manovich, the contemporary ‘medium’ in
McLuhan’s socially transformative sense of the
term is ultimately software. Accordingly, artists
such as Manovich (or ‘net artists, as they were
once known) focus predominately upon the
way in which software frames experience, and
upon visualisation of the Internet’s rhizomatic
relational qualities. Manovich frequently
addresses the sublime scale of networked, digital
connection, and this perhaps connects with
Banzi’s sense of feeling ‘overwhelmed’ by the
success of the Arduino project. In the context
of physical computing, however, where notions
of hardware and the physicality of things are
prominent, both the materiality and embedded,
environmental relationality of things come to
the fore. For technological determinists such
as Kittler (Kittler and Johnston 1997), there is
only hardware—software is at root a particular
material conﬁguration temporarily burned
into the architecture of microprocessor. In
recent times, through the notion of ‘the internet
of things’—a term ﬁrst coined by Kevin Ashton
in 1999 to address the commercial use of radio
frequency identiﬁcation technologies that has
latterly been subject to critical interrogation by
Sterling (2014)—a third aspect or frame of
reference has emerged that serves to collapse
the distinction between (linguistic) software
and (material) hardware, emphasising instead
a generalised connective/communicative ambi-
ence. At root, the interfacial aspects of software,
hardware and electrical interface are function-
ally united through a common concern with
choreographing relations and events. That is
to say, whichever of Lessard’s interfacial aspects
is under discussion, the Arduino operates as a
means of selectively channelling, routing and
producing networks of relations at some level
of description. Thus, from this perspective,
there is a sense in which the Arduino and
other physical computing platforms might be
said to both participate in and orchestrate
events. Ultimately it is consideration of the con-
ﬂicted agential status of objects and processes
that draws attention to one of the fault-lines
of process-philosophical thought. To elaborate
a little, there is a sense in which, at a certain
macro-level of description, we can simplify the
complexity, porosity and seemingly ambient
character of material-relationality by making a
distinction between ‘internal’ and ‘external’
relations—that is to say, in the context of Ardu-
ino, we might make a distinction between
activities taking place ‘within’ the microcontrol-
ler itself, and the way in which the microcon-
troller couples externally with the physical
world through quantised environmental infor-
mation. However, a more systemic, ecological
consideration or the problem foregrounds the
way in which, through any such coupling, an
entity becomes actively embedded within
broader environmental circumstance and is
thus ‘taken up’ by a higher description, or by
an emergent body of functionality. This is like-
wise helpful in understanding the ubiquity of
Arduino and its versatility of application—the
way in which, to quote Banzi, it has made its
way ‘into every ﬁeld imaginable’.
These early considerations of software, hard-
ware and environmental functionality are use-
ful in so far as they illustrate the versatility of
the process-philosophical outlook and demon-
strate its capabilities with respect to performing
aspectual shifts in terms of the scale and
modality of analysis. We will shortly explore
this in more detail when we examine Harman’s
(Bryant et al. 2011) object-oriented critique of
DIGITAL CREATIVITY 147
D
ow
nl
oa
de
d 
by
 [C
om
pu
tin
g &
 L
ibr
ary
 Se
rv
ice
s, 
Un
ive
rsi
ty 
of
 H
ud
de
rsf
iel
d]
 at
 04
:48
 22
 Ju
ne
 20
16
 
the process perspective. Before doing so, how-
ever, it makes sense to explore the way in
which process-philosophical thought likewise
enables a seamless slide between notions of
organic and inorganic agency that are funda-
mental to most contemporary materialist
forms of analysis.
6. Machinic and organic agency
Back in 2002, whilst exhibiting collaboratively
at the the Inter-Society for the Electronic Arts
(ISEA) in Nagoya Japan (Pettican and Roberts
2002), I witnessed an early incarnation of
Natalie Jeremijenko’s Feral Robotic Dog project
(Jeremijenko 2002–2006). At this stage of devel-
opment the artist exhibited a pack of modiﬁed
‘toy’ walking dogs. At this time, the sensorimo-
tor mechanism of the dogs was fairly simple—
and as a consequence the interaction with the
audience was still crude—the presence of pas-
sers-by would trigger the dogs, setting them
off as a pack. The effect was at once alarming
and slapstick in character. The dogs would
surge forward in an uncoordinated fashion—
yapping and barking, whilst some of them
would crash into one another, or fall onto
their sides. Once fallen they would twitch and
spin helplessly on the ﬂoor as the motors in
their legs continued to cycle. Despite its simpli-
city, Jeremijenkno’s project, through its crude
sensitivity to bystanders, nevertheless estab-
lished a kind of embedded ecological inter-
action—the movement of the ‘pack’ startled
the audience whilst eliciting laughter, delight
and inﬂuencing the ﬂow of bodies through the
space. At this time, Jeremijenko was already
experimenting with practices of socially and
environmentally engaged critical making—her
Feral Robotic Dogs project has from its outset
involved students and members of the public
in the construction and assembly of the dogs.
More, sophisticated versions of the dogs were
equipped with toxicity sensors and gained the
ability to seek out environmental pollution
(DiSalvo 2012). Consideration of the
sensorimotor coordination of automata along-
side simple biological organisms reveals an
interesting parity that illustrates how easily we
can transition between machinic and biological
levels of description. In consideration of this
transition we might draw upon the way in
which in A Thousand Plateaus, Deleuze and
Guattari (2008) famously utilised the biosemio-
tic thought of von Uexküll (1964) and his
notion of Umwelt, or species-speciﬁc lifeworld.
Deleuze-Guattari’s practical discussion of the
Tick as minimal organism with an extremely
limited environmental sensitivity is useful in
that it illustrates the importance of the concepts
of sensation, abstraction and connectivity in
Deleuzian philosophy, illustrating its processual
character, as well as the way in which these con-
cepts can serve as a gateway to a fully ontologi-
cal conception of relation. Thus we are
presented with a picture of a creature, which
has a limited experiential and behavioural
repertoire:
The Tick, attracted by the light, hoists itself up
to the tip of a branch; it is sensitive to the smell
of mammals, and lets itself fall when one
passes beneath the branch; it digs into its
skin, at the least hairy place it can ﬁnd. Just
three affects; the rest of the time the tick sleeps,
sometimes for years on end, indifferent to all
that goes on in its immense forest. (Deleuze
and Guattari 2008)
We can glean from the passage above that the
Tick is sensitive to light, the odour of mammals,
the sensation of hair and the temperature of
blood. These sensitivities are relational in the
semiotic sense, and they trigger respective beha-
viours (climbing, falling, sucking blood). This
example further brings out the ambiguity in
Deleuze usage of the term affect—in one sense
it refers to an experiential order (the sensation
of light, the smell of a mammal, the texture of
hair and the temperature of blood), but in
another it refers to the capabilities of a body—
or to what this particular body—in this particu-
lar, contingent set of environmental circum-
stances—can do (Spinoza 1955; Deleuze 1988).
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It is perhaps worth noting at this point that
despite the technological connotations of the
term of ‘cybernetics’, the concept is concerned
only in a secondary sense with the idea of
robotics. Primarily, it addresses navigation and
the material negotiation of an agent with respect
to its environment or milieu—with ‘cyber’
translating as ‘steersman’ (Ryan, Emerson, and
Robertson 2014). Thus the concern of both
Actor Network Theory and theories of affect
with material-semiotic relations can also be
seen to resonate with the cybernetic investi-
gation of the world—or with what we might
describe, following Deleuze, as an exploration
of the material world or ‘the intensities of a situ-
ation’—be it conducted by a human being, von
Uexküll’s Tick, or the inputs and outputs of a
microcontroller. The software engineer and
speculative realist philosopher Bogost (2012)
has recently explored what he takes to be a
more democratic conception of perception—
developing an expanded ontology that takes
into account, among other things, the ‘alien’
phenomenology of sensors, cameras, computers
and peripherals.
7. Machinic and material
environments
It should be clear from what has been said thus
far that this at oncematerial-semiotic and embo-
died sense of environmental navigation need not
be limited to consideration of hardware, or the
‘natural’ material environment. That is to say,
the concern here is with the concept of explora-
tion in the abstract, and accordingly such ideas
can likewise be connected with the navigation
of a disembodied, seemingly ethereal environ-
ment such as the World Wide Web. In the
early, low-bandwidth days of the Internet, the
idea of ‘surﬁng’ the net at times seemed absurd.
This was primarily due to a certain incongruity
of speeds—waiting for a page of text to appear
or for an image to download was not an experi-
ence charged with adrenaline. However, the sig-
niﬁcance of the ‘surﬁng’metaphor lies not in its
connection with velocities, but in the way in
which it addresses the navigation of a semantic
and semiotically intensive network—and this
need has little connection with the concept of
speed. The salient point with respect to the appli-
cation of this metaphor is that the individual
browsing the web navigates by variously seeking
out, or being seduced by the assorted hyperlinks,
hotspots and lines of connection within the page
—these are the thresholds or zones of intensity,
which can lead to the opening of new set of pos-
sibilities and to a transformation of a user’s
experience. With this intensive picture of
environmental navigation in mind, it seems no
coincidence that Wiener’s (1948) seminal work
on cybernetics addresses both animals and
machines. Indeed, an interest in cybernetics
and ecology often coexist, or are run together
in the writings of luminaries such as Wiener
and Gregory Bateson (1972).
DiSalvo (2012) has recently discussed Jere-
mijenko’s later neo-situationist interventions
into public spaces, placing them in the context
of political agonism and social dissent. Jeremi-
jenko orchestrates events whereby she releases
her robotic dogs in public parks as a means
of ‘snifﬁng out’ pollutants, whilst simul-
taneously creating a novel form of public spec-
tacle. These two phases or iterations of
Jeremijenko’s project are interesting in so far
as they illustrate the way in which the micro-
controller embedded within the dogs became
more reﬁned in its relational/semiotic sensi-
tivity, and how this expanded the creatures’
abilities. The dogs, now able to respond to
stimulus from a toxicity sensor, could channel
this broader spectrum of environmental sensi-
tivity—resulting in more nuanced control of
the servo-motors controlling their legs. Whilst
in one sense the dogs might still be said to
choreograph and channel a limited set of
environmental relations, it is nevertheless the
case that if we consider the dogs in aesthetic
and affective terms—as a form of spectacle,
as it were—we can see how they are also impli-
cated in a broader and less predictable form of
DIGITAL CREATIVITY 149
D
ow
nl
oa
de
d 
by
 [C
om
pu
tin
g &
 L
ibr
ary
 Se
rv
ice
s, 
Un
ive
rsi
ty 
of
 H
ud
de
rsf
iel
d]
 at
 04
:48
 22
 Ju
ne
 20
16
 
relational play. That is to say, when considered
in affective terms, Jeremijenko’s dogs create a
public spectacle that incites delight in an at
once playful and sinister fashion, mobilising
sub-representational viral imperatives, that
serve ultimately to generate media exposure
and to propagate environmentalist ideas and
ideals.
8. Institutional and amateur making
DiSalvo grounds his discussion of Jeremijenko’s
work in a consideration of tactical, critical
design practices that unsettle forms of political
hegemony through the staging of events.
DiSalvo likewise emphasises the way in which
hacktivist projects like Jeremijenko’s not only
engage in a micro-politics of disruption—
employing ‘unskilled’ labour in the context of
performance software workshops—but also
question, contest and reframe notions of what
constitutes expertise.
It is perhaps worth noting here that the his-
tory of electronics and invention is particularly
illustrative of the way in which formalised aca-
demic knowledge is parasitic upon the passion
of the amateur (a termwhich, tellingly, translates
as both ‘non-professional’ and ‘lover’) as they
explore undisclosed frontiers through an infor-
mal and non-institutional experimental practice.
Much of the innovation in the history of elec-
tronic invention took place outside of any for-
malised institutional activity, in spaces of
informal creation such as the home laboratory
and the inventor’s workshop or shed. It is this
kind of informal experimentation that is
embraced and celebrated by both the Arduino
project and by the Maker Community as a
whole, most notably in their celebration of the
practice of ‘tinkering’. Indeed, from amaterialis-
tic perspective, the activity of the amateur, or the
unsalaried ‘lover’ of a particular practice, can be
seen as a pre-requisite for institutional for-
mation. Accordingly, in his 1000 Years of Non-
Linear History DeLanda (1997), building on
the on the insights of Peter F Drucker, tells us:
Few of the major ﬁgures in 19th century tech-
nology received much formal education. The
typical inventor was a mechanic who began
his apprentice ship at age fourteen or earlier.
The few who had gone to college [Eli Whitney,
Samuel Morse] had not, as a rule, been trained
in technology or science, but were liberal arts
students. … Technological invention and the
development of industries based on new
knowledge were in the hands of craftsmen
and artisans with little scientiﬁc education
but a great deal of mechanical genius.
DeLanda goes on to suggest that a condition for
the implementation of the industrial laboratory
of the twentieth century was the material con-
text of the ‘self-taught inventor’ of the nine-
teenth century but following the institution of
the industrial laboratory, there came a ‘reversal
in the balance of power between formal and
informal knowledge’. A similar pragmatic and
materialist approach to institutional history
can be located in David Bodanis’ Electric Uni-
verse (2005).
DeLanda’s point is that the emergence of uni-
versities and formalised knowledge economies
arises out of contingent material and historical
processes—indeed, he goes on to extend this, in
the spirit of process philosophy, to ‘all structures
that surround us and form our reality (moun-
tains, animals and plants, human languages,
social institutions)’. One consequence of DeLan-
da’s broadly process-oriented Deleuzian materi-
alism is a foregrounding of the importance of
extrinsic and contingent nature of relation.
That is to say, for DeLanda it is out of material
forms of practice that both institutions and insti-
tutional norms ultimately arise, and there is
nothing natural, eternal or necessary about the
institutional arrangements of the knowledge
economy. In short, he emphasises the way in
which practice precedes theory in the formation
of socio-cultural circumstance. Accordingly,
such constructivist practices are ﬁxated upon
concepts of change and transformation, and as
a consequence, contemporary materialisms
often have a revolutionary bent.
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In the context of electronic digital media,
there is a concern with distributed, networked
forms of social organisation/interaction, as
well as processual concerns with input, output
and the encapsulation of function, and this
can be seen to be manifested both at the levels
of hardware and software. With this in mind,
it is easy to see how Bruno Latour’s Actor Net-
work theory, or DeLanda’s own Assemblage
Theory (2002, 2006), has had such purchase,
emphasising as they do the neutrality or ﬂatten-
ing of actors (human/non-human) into func-
tional networks, along with the at once
material, affective and semiotic systemic con-
nections that serve ultimately to constitute
them. Thus Latour’s position is useful when
attempting to theorise the connectivity of digital
artefacts or when attempting to trace patterns of
human computer interaction in a democratic
and non-anthropocentric fashion. However, it
is important to remember that Latour’s ontol-
ogy is intended to account for all phenomena
as products of heterogeneous, socio-technical,
networks and that it is intended to be applied
outside of a purely digital, electronic or compu-
tational realm.
Perhaps unsurprisingly, Latourian ideas have
a particular appeal to those working in the con-
texts of computational forms of art and design.
This is to be expected, given that Latour’s ideas
arose out of science and technology studies—a
ﬁeld of enquiry concerned not only with the
socio-cultural analysis of science and its techni-
cal products, but also with technological modes
of representation and the role of computation
metaphors within contemporary culture. With
this in mind, it is worth considering how new
materialist ideas impact upon naturalistic and
computational conceptions of process. Bogost
(2010), the speculative realist most prominently
concerned with technological analysis, has
made an interesting distinction between ‘pro-
cess’ and ‘procedure’ that can help us to under-
stand one of the core tensions between process
and object-oriented philosophies. Bogost notes
how a ‘procedure’ (in computational terms)
can be considered as a form of representation
that addresses the operation of things—their
‘logic of behaviour’, or ‘how they proceed’. For
Bogost, such procedural forms of explanation
provide a valuable perspective on the nature/
character of any given entity. He goes on to
explain how the concept of ‘process’—at least
as it occurs in the context of process philosophy
—should be distinguished from such functional
and representational concerns, being primarily
concerned with an unanalysed ‘ﬂow of events’
or with what he goes on to term the ‘hydraulic
rush’ or the perpetual ‘becoming’ of reality. As
such, for Bogost, process philosophy’s metaphy-
sics of novelty or creation is unable to provide
anything approaching a genuine form of expla-
nation. Bogost goes on to develop an account of
the importance of ‘white boxing’ or ‘glass box-
ing’ of actual entities—which he positions as a
practical mode of analysis that attempts to
infer the procedures/assumptions that coordi-
nate the operational dynamics of any given
entity. Bogost notes how glass boxing is at once
a metaphorical and representational activity,
involving both inference and analysis. This
account of procedural representation feeds into
an at once technologically deterministic and
activist line of thought that stresses value of pro-
cedural thinking in unpicking the rhetorical
operation of systems (the way in which software
could be said to programme us). This mode of
thinking will be familiar to anyone who has
attempted to contemplate or penetrate the work-
ings of another system—be it in order to
implement the simplest hack/augmentation of
a child’s toy, an attempt to decode the communi-
cations protocols of a system/peripheral that
produces serial output, or simply, to use Bogost’s
own example, the pondering of the political
assumptions that might be encoded in the latest
world building strategy game (Bogost 2007).
Despite a healthy interest in rhetoric (a mode
of persuasion more at home with materialist
talk of ‘degrees’ and ‘intensities’ than with
logico-propositional modes of discussion),
Bogost’s examples of procedures are or the
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most part clean, rationalist and overtly machi-
nic. As a consequence, they betray his more
overt concern with software and seem slightly
removed from the more gritty organic material-
ism of the seminal speculative realist, Graham
Harman, who is as likely to discuss the visceral
life of oil slicks and slag heaps than anything
explicitly technological. Nevertheless, it is Har-
man who serves as the primary inspiration for
Bogost’s thinking. Bogost’s notion that white
boxing is a metaphorical means of represen-
tationally modelling other entities does, how-
ever, draw attention to what object-oriented
ontologists see as the inherent internal privacy
of entities. Thus Bogost is keen to emphasise
that within any given entity, ‘swirls of murky
logics turn’—and that it is this ‘hidden logic’,
when combined with the propensity of entities
to combine and form other entities that is ulti-
mately responsible for the emergency of novelty
in the world. For Bogost, the internal logics that
trigger the transformation of the world may be
dark or cloudy, but it is important to remember
that they are logics nevertheless.
A second, more visceral and more directly
material approach to the representation of the
internal privacy of things can be found in the
work of the artist Martin Howse—which serves
to connect the murky rationalism of Bogost
with the dark materiality of Harman. Howse’s
‘detektors’ (2007—ongoing) are tunable devices
for ‘full spectrum exploration of the electromag-
netic domain’, which assail their user with a var-
iety of hums, clicks, howls and squeals,
alongside quasi-rhythmic sonic punctuation
and bursts of white noise. This form of soniﬁ-
cation serves to reanimate our perception of
the at once internal, and alien life of ‘solid
state’ technologies in a way that poignantly sup-
plements Bogost’s more distant, functional and
representational form of modelling. Accord-
ingly, we might borrow a distinction between
politics and the political that has recently been
employed by both DiSalvo (2012) and Fry
(2006) in works addressing design and politics,
to suggest that for the most part Bogost analyses
the external politics of things (their routine ‘unit
operations’ and protocols, whilst Howse’s more
material interventions, attempt to more directly
articulate the opaque political subjectivity of
things through a process of sonic mediation.
Arguably, however, it is only by combining
the perspectives of Bogost and Howse that we
can come close to the oddly visceral-material-
rationality that is suggested by Harman’s
object-oriented ontology.
Carolyn Christov-Bakargiev’s dOCU-
MENTA, 2013, provides an interesting vehicle
for considering the application of newmaterialist
thought in non-computational contexts as it was
strongly inﬂuenced by Latourian ideas as well as
emerging forms of new materialist and speculat-
ive realist thought—but consisted for the most
part of non-digital, material artefacts, which
were nevertheless expressive of a set of contem-
porary materialistic concerns. Thus Bakargiev’s
selection included Huyghe’s (2011–2012) sculp-
ture of a reclining female nude on a cement
block, which followed classical sculptural con-
ventions with the exception that the head of
the ﬁgure had been replaced by a hive of swarm-
ing bees, and Geoffrey Farmer’s Leaves of Grass
(2013) —an enormous sculptural collage of cul-
tural detritus that was entirely constructed out
of images cut or torn from copies of life maga-
zine from 1935 to 1985—emphasising the viral,
vital and rhizomatic quality of the growth and
transformation of culture over a period of 50
years. Bakargiev’s exhibition also included Ryan
Gander’s I Need Some Meaning I Can Memorise
(The Invisible Pull) (2013) which consisted of a
breeze ﬂowing through the otherwise empty
ground ﬂoor of the Fridericianum—attuning us
to the movement, reality and tangible operation
of breeze—a somewhat neglected range of the
agency spectrum that all too often goes unno-
ticed in our day-to-day environmental dealings.
It should be clear from what has been said
thus far that the writings of speculative realists
such as Harman and Bogost, along with works
of new materialists such as Bennett and Bakar-
giev, combine a recognition of the obstinate
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intractability of ontological essence with a
material, vitalistic and ecological emphasis
that nevertheless presents a picture of environ-
mental embeddedness, material constitution
and agglomerated, aggregative agency, and it
should be clear that there is a strong degree of
compatibility between these positions and the
more machinic and somewhat angular analysis
of Latour. It should likewise be apparent that
much new materialist thought presents us
with a picture of impersonal, nested interaction
that admits of numerous levels of description.
The process philosopher Nicholas Rescher cap-
tures this well when he suggests that reality itself
might best be considered:
One vast all encompassing megaprocess con-
sisting of virtually endless concentration of sub-
ordinate sub-processes—a Chinese nesting of
box within box as it were. (Rescher 1996, 94)
9. The angular and intensive analysis
of identity
Despite many points of overlap, the various
strains of new materialistic thought that have
been presented thus far suggest rival pictures
of angularity and intensity. Thus for some
new materialists the image of an atomistic
node-line connectivity dominates, whilst for
others there is a more diffuse, ﬁeld-based, kin-
etic approach to phenomena. This should not
be surprising, when we consider how the vitalis-
tic functionalism of new materialist thought
serves to level notions of human and non-
human and to collapse ‘natural’ and ‘technical’
realms.
There is a dispute running through much
contemporary materialist thinking that arises
out of a broadly post-structuralist concern
with anti-essentialism that is premised upon
notions of performativity and the operation of
difference, and which serves ultimately to com-
plicate discussions of identity. The problem
arises, because the same patterns of argument
that are employed as a means of establishing
the centrality of performance, functional
aggregation and levels of description to the
attribution of agency in Actor Network Theory,
for instance, seem—when followed through to
their conclusion—to result in the de-materiali-
sation, and disempowerment of the political
subject (Irigaray and Pluha 2008).
To elaborate a little, we have already seen
how process-philosophical thought attempts to
reduce stable, ordered and bounded entities to
prior forms of movement and connection. As a
consequence, issues of scale, porosity and their
distribution across a variety of scales are effec-
tively intertwined and as such must be discussed
in tandem. There is, according to the process
perspective, a macro-level of analysis, at which
I might describe myself variously as an individual
human being, or as a socio-political actor. Look-
ing upwards (and outwards) from this vantage
point, however, I might likewise cite my contri-
bution to, or absorption in, the agency of collec-
tives, or of other social institutions of which I am
a part. Looking further still I might draw atten-
tion to my relational connection to society or
the wider natural world. Process philosophy
operates on a cosmological scale and as a conse-
quence I may continue working outwards ad
inﬁnitum, considering my place in the cosmos
as a whole. Conversely, looking down (and in),
there is another sense in which I must acknowl-
edge that my body is dependent upon a multi-
tude of other (non-human) actants. Even at
this early stage of analysis, I seem to melt into
different magnitutes of agency and order. Indeed,
there is an important sense in which Charles and
Ray Eams animated ﬁlm Powers of Ten (1968–
1977) and the book that inspired it—Kees
Boeke’s Cosmic View: The Universe in 40 Jumps
(1957) could be said to illustrate one of the
fundamental problems of design. That is to say,
the Eams’ ﬁlm provokes a bewildering and
sublime sense of systemic interrelation, whilst
simultaneously provoking a vertiginous desire
for boundaries and order as the camera, indiffer-
ent to the border-threshold of human ﬂesh,
appears to seamlessly zoom between macro-
and micro-cosmological extremes.
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10. The object-centric critique of
process philosophy
Both post-modernism and post-structuralism in
their resistance to any timeless or natural con-
ceptions of order develop strategies of resistance
that recast seemingly ‘natural’ or ‘eternal’ forms
of social organisation, presenting them as artiﬁ-
cially constructed and as highly contingent in
character. Post-structuralism arose out of revo-
lutionary politics, but it has not been without its
critics on the left (Irigaray 1985; Haraway
2008), who have drawn attention to the way
in which its emphasis upon the performative
and contingent ultimately serves to decentre
and diffuse political agency. That is to say, for
process philosophy’s detractors, the demateria-
lisation of the object of resistance (the position-
ing of institutions as contingent, non-essential
constructions in an attempt to facilitate their
transformation) likewise entails the demateriali-
sation of the object that resists (e.g. the demater-
ialisation or decentring of the political actor or
revolutionary). Thus, the famous dispute
between the feminist philosopher Luce Irigaray
and the process-materialist Gilles Deleuze con-
cerned the status of political agency (Irigaray
was primarily concerned with female political
agency, but her argument can be extended to
molar categories of object-oriented agency per
se). Irigaray objected to the way in which
Deleuze’s philosophy positioned the ‘actual’
macro-phenomenal world of people and things
as a kind of ﬁction, or as a second-order reality
that arose out of a more fundamental material
play of forces, that Deleuze described as the Vir-
tual. For Irigaray, Deleuze’s philosophy, in what
she took to be its abandonment of any notion of
‘molar’ agency, effectively neutered its own pol-
itical power. In a similar fashion, the speculative
realist Harman (Bryant et al. 2011) has more
recently suggested that Deleuze fails to appreci-
ate both the integrity of individual things along
with their agential power to transform the
world. For Harman there is an important
sense in which Deleuze’s philosophy ‘overmines
entities’ in its reduction of things to their consti-
tutive relations. Irigaray’s ‘agent-centric’ cri-
tique of Irigaray was (tangentially) extended in
Haraway’s (2008) critique of Deleuze that pre-
sented Deleuzian philosophy as ‘other worldly’,
and thus not truly grounded/ecological, and as
we shall shortly see how there is a comparable
tendency in speculative realist criticism to pos-
ition Deleuze as a kind of contemporary mystic,
propagating an esoteric, and ultimately impo-
verished philosophy that is disconnected from
the actual world.
Deleuze andGuattari’s (2008) implicit response
to Irigaray is, however, interesting—drawing
attention to the excessive abstraction that con-
ditions her employment of binary, conceptual, cat-
egories (e.g. male/female) and suggesting that a
properly materialistic politics should be less
abstract and more complex—allowing for not
just for two, but for what Elizabeth Grosz (1993)
would go on to term a ‘thousand tiny sexes’.
Such ‘actualist’ criticism tends to either ignore
or downplay Deleuze’s own political activism,
and his more practical work with Guattari. It is
however useful in so far as it draws attention to
the activity, range, hybridity and vitality of
‘actual’ networks. By way of illustration, and
bringing the discussion back to the context of
Arduino, it is important to remember that
when considering the Arduino project from a
network perspective, we must think electrically,
functionally, socially, materially and semioti-
cally. That is to say, by dwelling on the electrical
interface alone we miss the way in which Ardu-
ino was taken out of the world of computing and
amateur electronics and inserted into networks
of design culture. Thus, the initial Arduino
boards were soldered by hand in a succession
of maker workshops—and similarly, it was a
series of forum-based competitions that gave
rise to the initial Arduino logo and brand. At
the time of its inception, Arduino stood as a
rival to much more expensive peripheral inter-
face controller-based development systems
such as the i-cube. Arduino’s success in the
milieu of physical computing was a result of a
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number of factors: cost effectiveness; the inte-
gration of the diverse array of development sys-
tems that were needed to programme solid-state
devices into one self-contained solution; and an
open architecture which in turn gave birth to a
wealth of peripherals, as well as to a plethora of
‘clone’ and mutant devices (versions of the
board with extended functionality, which were
typically constructed by third-party makers).
However, in discussion of the circulation and
mutation of the Arduino, it is important to also
address the circulation of images—the pro-
duction and dissemination of distinctive pro-
motional devices such as logo/packaging/
stickers (respectively ways of territorialising
and distributing identity) that in part arose out
of reciprocal relationships developedwith design
communities and networks. It was only in a late
stage of development that Giorgio Olivero of the
design ﬁrm ToDo (himself an ex-tutor of Banzi)
was tasked with ﬁnally planting the Arduino’s
ﬂag—exchanging its plain, brown-box packa-
ging for Pantone 313.
11. Harman’s object-oriented
ontology
The spat between Irigaray and Deleuze points to
a core tension in contemporary realist philos-
ophies between philosophers that emphasise
the material-processual constitution of entities
—such as the new materialist Bennett (2010)
and the speculative realist Grant (2006) —and
those that assert the primacy of objects. With
respect to the latter thesis, there is a weak
sense in which we might cite the black-boxed,
angularity of Latour, but a much stronger
object-centric thesis has been proposed by Har-
man, in his object-oriented philosophy, and it is
to this which we will now turn.
Rescher (1996, 27) has described how the
ﬂuidity of process philosophy enables it to par-
take of many forms of philosophical analysis.
Thus he distinguishes between ontological and
epistemological forms of processual thought.
According to Rescher, the former has a
metaphysical bent, whilst the latter stays close
to empirical states of affairs. This provides an
interesting bridge between the broadly empiri-
cal approach of Latour (describing tangible net-
works of agency that are visible in the world)
and the speculative, object-oriented philosophy
of Harman which begins as a critical response to
process philosophy, asserting the primacy of
substance over process and calling for a re-
evaluation of agency and of what we might
term ‘the integrity of things’. Harman’s critique
builds on the earlier “actualist” criticism of Iri-
garay and Haraway and is likewise aimed at
Deleuze. Harman’s object-oriented version of
speculative realism is distinctive in its out-
and-out resistance to processual ontology. Har-
man goes on to develop a strongly metaphysical
position, which emphasises what he takes to be
the hidden and inaccessible depths of all of the
objects/entities that constitute the furniture of
the world, as well as the inherent privacy and
inaccessibility of this ‘withdrawn cores’. Har-
man’s philosophy gives us an intuitively appeal-
ing way of thinking about the boundaries and
temporal continuity of objects, but it is no
sense positivistic or metaphysically impover-
ished. Harman develops a strongly metaphys-
ical position that develops a notion of an
aesthetic liaison—or aesthetic causality—that
takes place between independent and funda-
mentally unknowable objects. That is to say,
for Harman, causality itself is mediated through
the operation of an object’s phenomenological
‘sensual surface’.
In order to unpack Harman’s position, it is
perhaps worth considering Gere’s (2013) recent
comments upon the Arduino-based work of the
artist Stanza. In a review of Stanza’s work, Gere
suggests that the artist in some way enacts a set
of object-oriented philosophical concerns. Thus
Stanza’s Emergent City: From Complexity to the
City of Bits consists of a set of networkedmiscel-
laneous objects that despite being laid out in a
fashion that is evocative of a city, and appearing
to operate in a vaguely systemic fashion, ulti-
mately serves to defy intellectual capture. Gere
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stresses that Stanza ‘understands how to use in
creative and novel ways a whole range of tools
and technologies’, and that as a consequence,
his work provides ‘a kind of map of shifting
technological realities and possibilities’. Addres-
sing the way in which ‘lights go on and off, and
elements revolve at intervals’, Gere emphasises
the resonance with Harman’s object-oriented
philosophy in so far as:
Things are happening, both on the ﬂoor and
on the walls, but what they are is not immedi-
ately apparent. Far from being a problem I
suggest that this opacity is the work’s great
strength. Its very refusal of easy understand-
ing is a profound reﬂection on the world
itself, and the degree to which it is available
to us.
In the context of his analysis of Stanza’s work,
Gere draws attention to the way in which the
elements of Stanza’s city-like assemblage are
driven by information that is in some sense
withdrawn from, or inaccessible to, the audi-
ence (the lights and motors within the gallery
are triggered by a set of sensors that are
recording information from the environment
of Stanza’s home)—and this in some sense
tallies with Harman’s notion that the objects
that we encounter in the world possess a
surplus of inaccessible resources—that is, the
sense in which there is always more to them
than meets the eye. Thus Gere stresses the
‘black-boxed’ nature of the objects that
together constitute Stanza’s city and suggests
that it is the operation of this inaccessible
surplus that perpetually confounds our reading
of the work.
However, if Stanza’s work could be said to
enact Harman’s philosophy of intractable, with-
drawn entities, it could also be said to enact some
of its tensions or problems. This becomes most
apparent when Gere addresses the issue of the
relationality of objects. Thus Gere explains that
everything ‘can and does communicate with
everything else’, but that much of this communi-
cation ‘is not easily available to human subjects’.
The keyword here with respect to understanding
Harman’s position is ‘communication’ as
opposed to ‘connection’ and the subtle differ-
ences in meaning between these terms highlights
a particular disagreement between process and
object-oriented philosophies. Gere’s choice of
the term ‘communication’ is apt but there is a
sense in which it obscures one of the most coun-
ter-intuitive aspects of Harman’s philosophy,
which concerns the tension between the notion
of self-contained, independent objects and the
possibility of their interaction.
12. Evaluating tensions between
object- and process-oriented
ontologies
Harman’s position is distinctive in so far as he
can be taken as developing a critique of Deleuze,
which contorts a number of Deleuze’s processual
insights in order to construct a rival metaphysics
of objecthood. Initially, with his observation that
we need to take objects seriously, Harman
appears to emphasising their agency (a la Iri-
garay) or to be cutting through what is some-
times taken to be, despite its professed
materialism, the otherworldly, philosophically
idealist aspect of Deleuzian thought—as when
the virtual is positioned as an inaccessible
realm that conditions and produces the phenom-
enal actual (this is the basis of Haraway’s cri-
tique). Interestingly, when taken out of context,
the arguments of Haraway and Irigaray have a
certain ‘back to basics’ positivistic ring that
seems prohibitive of metaphysical enquiry. Har-
man on the other hand, as a speculative realist,
embraces a fully metaphysical realism, and ulti-
mately produces a more convoluted and ethereal
picture of reality than that of Deleuze—a self-
proclaimed ‘weird realism’ (Harman 2012) that
is at the very least as strange as Deleuze’s philos-
ophy with its virtual–actual distinction.
Harman’s motivation with his object-
oriented ontology is to secure a place for the
agency of individual things alongside their priv-
acy and internal surplus. Harman sees this state
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of affairs as a necessary condition for the insti-
tution of change in the world. That is to say,
for Harman it is the operation of this interior
surplus that is ultimately responsible for the
change and transformation of things. Arguably
however, in the construction of his own philos-
ophy, Harman simply reconﬁgures the central
Deleuzian dualism of virtual/actual, proposing
instead a dualism of real/sensual object (Shaviro
2014). Thus Harman might be said to recast
Deleuze’s ontological problem as opposed to
resolving it in any genuine sense. Harman claims
that Deleuze’s relational philosophy has no
means of accounting for change in the world
(Harman 2012), suggesting that if every entity
is constituted and therefore exhausted by its
relationships then there is nowhere from which
novelty might emerge (Harman 2007). Har-
man’s critique, however, focuses upon on a
rather narrow range of the rich spectrum of
relation that is operative in Deleuze’s writings
—dwelling for the most part upon the syncretist
and eternalist conception of relation that is most
prominent in The Logic of Sense (Deleuze 1990)
and in his book on Leibniz, The Fold (Deleuze
1993). However, there are a number of alterna-
tive approaches to this concept that can be
located within Deleuze’s corpus. There is, for
example, a genetic, differential and productive
conception of relation at work in Difference
and Repetition (Deleuze 2001) as well as a
more pragmatic, overtly political sense of
relation or environmental relationship that is
developed in his collaboration with Guattari
(Deleuze and Guattari 2008). Tellingly,
Deleuze’s rather diverse speculations on the con-
cept of relation share an instrumental unity in so
far as they each express, in their own distinctive
fashion, a set of process-philosophical concerns
with the primacy of becoming and the pro-
duction of the new. Key toDeleuze’s genetic con-
ception of change is the role of creative tensions
that arise through the confrontational interplay
of differential ﬂows, or ﬁelds of force. Thus,
Deleuze’s virtual seems in many ways
comparable to Harman’s notion of an object’s
withdrawn ‘molten core’—each presenting a pic-
ture of an at once dynamic and inaccessible
surplus that is ultimately productive of change.
Consideration of the concept of relation in
Deleuze’s and Harman’s philosophies draws
attention to a certain more generalised paradox
of relational constitution. That is to say, if for
Deleuze the hyper-material connection of things
results in a problem of individuality or differen-
tiation, then for Harman the hyper-integrity of
individual objects results in an inverse problem
of communication or inﬂuence.
The respective difﬁculties of Deleuze and
Harman’s philosophies can be seen to arise
out of a common problem of interaction
between realms that are presented as being in
some sense separate, withdrawn or distinct.
We have seen how, for Deleuze, there is an
issue concerning the relationship between
what he positions as an in some sense illusory,
actual, phenomenal world and how this might
relate to the workings of a more primary, rela-
tional and energetic ‘virtual’ plane. For Harman,
however the problem is more extreme. That is
to say, if we follow Harman’s positioning of
objects as self-contained substances through to
its philosophical conclusion, a more complex
problem of interaction would seem to arise.
This is because, in Harman’s, at once pluralistic
and self-contained actualism, objects, by virtue
of their intrinsic separation from others, seem
only one step away from becoming entirely
detached worlds-in-themselves—and this
would be in line with the philosophical deﬁ-
nitions of substance that tend to stress substan-
tial self-sufﬁciency. Accordingly, this gives rise
to a number of problems. Firstly there is the
issue of interaction between what is ‘withdrawn’
and what is ‘present’ with respect to any given
object, which as we have seen is in some sense
analogous to Deleuze’s problem of virtual–
actual interaction. Secondly, however, there is
a not unrelated and equally serious problem
concerning the interaction between actual, but
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nevertheless fundamentally separate entities—a
problem concerning the way in which individ-
ual entities communicate with, or causally inﬂu-
ence one another.
13. Harman’s aesthetic causation
Harman’s metaphysically elaborate solution is
to suggest that all of the entities in the world
confront one another phenomenally in a
mediated fashion through the production of a
series of ‘noisy’ and limited ‘sensual’ surface-
objects—and it is this imagistic liaison that pro-
vides the basis for an aesthetic mode of causal
interaction (an interaction of appearances).
For Harman, individual things (whether
human, non-human, organic or inorganic in
character) are capable of inﬂuencing one
another but only through a kind of aesthetic
allure. Thus there is a kind of tragically beautiful
aesthetic causation that could be said to be
operative in Harman’s ontology—Harman’s
objects constantly tantalise and subject one
another to provocation—but nevertheless
remain fundamentally separate in their with-
drawal. Arguably however, with this notion of
vicarious causation Harman introduces a
ghostly kind of relationality—the things of the
world do not straightforwardly connect, but
they are nevertheless ‘touched’ and ‘moved’
through their aesthetic interaction (Harman
2007).
If Harman were consistent in his account of
independent objects or substances, the idea of a
single common world populated by discrete
entities would seem to fragment into a picture
of a multiple, hermetically sealed entities that
are perpetually implored by phenomenal
appearances to subject themselves to change.
In his account of substance and relations, we
can witness Harman wrestling with this view.
On the one hand he suggests that through the
vehicle of intentionality (purposive inter-object
engagement), ‘shafts or freight tunnels are con-
structed between objects that otherwise remain
quarantined in private vacuums’ (Harman
2007), whilst on the other he explains that
‘objects confront one another only by proxy,
through sensual proﬁles found only on the
interior of some other entity’. The ﬁrst of
these alternatives implies a kind of ontological
connection, but one that sits awkwardly with
Harman’s more generalised picture of purely
imagistic liaison. The second is equally curious
and somewhat paradoxical in so far as it has
an idealistic or even solipsistic tone, whilst
nevertheless suggesting a massive proliferation
of ‘intentional’ objects. Taken together, these
rather different conceptions of causal or com-
municative interaction seem to push against
one another and this ultimately serves to gener-
ate further complications—that is to say, the
more Harman addresses the problem of com-
munication, the more prismatic and fragmented
his world would seem to become.
14. Ethical connotations and
applications
Ultimately both the philosophies of Harman
and Deleuze have a predominately aesthetic
and affective orientation—each possessing an
at once material and semiotic character. How-
ever, with respect to this debate, Hassan’s
(1987) distinction between modernist paranoia
and postmodern schizophrenia might be said
to loom large—that is to say we might draw
an interesting distinction between Harman
and Deleuze’s philosophical positions along
the lines of introversion and extroversion. To
elaborate a little, there is a sense in which we
might describe Deleuze’s philosophy as gener-
ous, extravert and life afﬁrming in so far as we
are counseled by Deleuze to embrace difference
and to experiment with the intensities of living.
For Harman, on the other hand, a kind of
phenomenal glamour or subterfuge dominates
in so far as all causation has an aesthetic quality
and a somewhat fraudulent edge. That is to say,
embracing Harman’s position, we ﬁnd ourselves
petitioned by a ﬂood of appearances that serve
to obscure and conceal the objects that
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ultimately stand as their ground. As a conse-
quence, there is a sense in which this might
be said to foreground questions of ethics and
how we are to live.
The philosopher May (1997) once criticised
Delueze on the grounds that his philosophy
was totalitarian and foundationalist in charac-
ter, in so far as it attempted to encode the
play of difference at an unassailable material
level by effectively ingraining it in matter.
Deleuze’s strategy is of course paradoxical—
employing a material principle of difference as
a foundation, with the intent of establishing
perpetual unsettlement. Placing his criticisms
aside, however, May goes on to suggest that
there might be a role for Deleuze’s idea of the
Virtual in so far as it could serve as an encoded
ethical or political commitment, and thus might
stand an idea that could coordinate ones activity
—or the activity of a group. This provides an
avenue for considering the ethical consequence
of Deleuze and Harman’s philosophies. We
have seen how, when embracing Deleuzian
ideals, there is always potential for social trans-
formation and institutional change—but that
there is also a sense in which we must give our-
selves up in the process of resistance. For Har-
man, on the other hand there appears to be
space for entrenched individual commitments
—but we must allow for similarly intractable
commitments with respect to our opposition.
Thus it is perhaps the tone of Harman’s philos-
ophy and its practical application—as opposed
to any metaphysical detail—that invited Sha-
viro’s comments concerning its alleged tendency
towards stasis. However, Harman is not alone
here—we have seen how Deleuze’s position is
likewise capable of fostering paradoxes that
might be generative of political apathy. It is
perhaps for this reason that both Shaviro and
Harman grudgingly acknowledge one another’s
criticism and reach for a (remarkably similar)
mid-ground position—and this is no doubt
itself testament to Shaviro’s comment that the
difference between them is really one of
emphasis.
15. Conclusion
In this seeming standoff between deceptive-
authenticity and connective-mutation, I am,
for a number of reasons, ultimately inclined to
side with the more transformative, post-struc-
turalist, process-philosophical orientation of
Deleuze. Firstly, we have seen how process phil-
osophy asserts the primacy of movement and
the absolute ontological priority of change—
and whilst it seems clear that there is a sense
in which stasis might be reduced to movement
(a fast enough vibration results in apparent
solidity of form), it is rather less clear how
movement might be reduced to any form of sta-
sis, without a signiﬁcant metaphysical change of
gear (and no small amount of special pleading).
Object-oriented ontology’s emphasis upon the
integrity of things would, however, seem to
lean towards the latter position (as is evinced
in Harman’s notion of withdrawn essential
cores, and in Bogost’s emphasis upon the
value of the functional modelling of how things
procede) and it is this aspect of speculative rea-
lism that would seem to have featured most pro-
minently in Shaviro’s critique. The situation
becomes further complicated when we consider
the way in which Harman disputes Shaviro’s
claim that his object-oriented ontology should
be considered a philosophy of stasis. That is to
say, we have seen how the withdrawn surplus
of entities that Harman ultimately invokes to
explain such change embodies both a structural
similarity and a similar problematic to that
which accompanies the Deleuzian virtual/actual
distinction. Lastly, the notion that process philos-
ophy has no resources with which to address
‘objects’ or political agency is simply misguided
—as Rescher (1996, 98) has noted, the macro-
structures of process philosophy can be con-
sidered meta-stable constancies—rhythmic enti-
ties which are functional and effective but
nevertheless contingent in nature. We have seen
how the porosity of process philosophy and its
emphasis upon transformation confers a certain
power to cross-modalities and scales. As a
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consequence, there is a sense in which it seems
able to encompass all of the new materialisms
—be they angular, intensive, biological, techno-
logical, epistemological or ontological in charac-
ter—and this need not exclude Harman’s
object-oriented ontology if we recognise the
dynamism of his concealed ‘molten’ cores, and
if we are allowed to factor in his philosophy’s
rather spectral, or phantom sense of relation.
In closing it is worth returning once more to
Banzi’s notion that the Arduino board might be
considered a means of ‘scratching your own
itch’. We have noted the curious interplay
between the material and the affective in
relation to the processes of ‘scratching’ and
‘itching’ which from the perspective of proces-
sual thinking would seem to result in a situation
where neither the scratch nor the itch has causal
priority. We have likewise seen how the appar-
ent privacy implied by Banzi’s statement serves
to obscure the broader, more pervasive sense of
relationality that would seem to condition the
Arduino project as well as the rich sense of inno-
vation that was so prominent throughout Banzi’s
talk. Indeed, the success of the Arduino stands as
a testament to the way in which its makers evi-
dently know (and live) networks on so many
levels (be they technical, material, creative or
semiotic in character). Earlier we drew attention
to the rich spectrum of relation that is oper-
ational across Deleuze’s various writings and
the way in which they address a range of onto-
logical scales and strata (as if each work had
been written for a different philosophical audi-
ence). Arguably, however, common to all of
Deleuze’s writings is a stress upon the vitality
and dynamism of relations (surely the very
essence of a network) which points to the idea
that, as Peter Hallward has suggested, we should
consider ‘Being’ itself as creativity. From this per-
spective, the ontological status of the Arduino is
perhaps less important than its role in constitut-
ing, animating and reanimating networks
through the production of new relations. Writing
on technology in his recent Design as Politics
Tony Fry warns of its coercive and reductive
aspects, drawing the reader’s attention to the sin-
ister way in which technological artefacts ‘once
designed, continue to design’. In contrast to
Fry’s bleak vision of technological determinism
(that is for the most part focused upon a global
consumer context), Arduino offers a vision of
technology that, in its afﬁnity with maker and
activist culture, is predominately productive
and vitalist in character. With this technological
vitalism in mind, we might subvert Fry’s
designerly scepticism to suggest that the most
distinctive quality of the Arduino project has
been the way in which once designed it began
to sign—to draw (human and non-human)
actors into its network(s), fostering new relations
and curious alliances—perpetually facilitating
new ways to scratch and new ways to itch.
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